States embroiled in mutual rivalry have limited strategic options. They can pursue an offensive posture aimed at expanding their influence, territory, and resources. Alternatively, when states feel threatened, they can strive to protect and defend their territory and sovereignty – compelling them to maximize their security under the perceived threat of vulnerability. Whichever approach a country chooses, it must contend with a ‘quantity vs. quality’ conundrum, which is where the question of the need for parity will arise.
The ‘offense-defense theory’ helps in examining the India-Pakistan quest for achieving strategic stability in the region. Since the Second World War, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has greatly impacted the . However, with the development of nuclear weapons, the ODB shifted in favor of relatively weaker states as the meaning of military victory changed. In this regard, even the pursuit of retaliatory or second-strike capabilities by powerful states did not necessarily ensure survivability or security.
Reiterating the dictum that ‘offense is the best defense,’ the state on the ‘offensive’ as per the ‘offense-defense theory’ develops a force posture, achieves military preparedness, and consumes and invests capital into arms build-up “ generate more security when offensive capabilities are less expansive than defensive ones.”
The case of Pakistan is not different in this regard. The offensive-defense strategy of riposte (that surfaced during the 1989 Zarb-e-Momin conventional military exercises) was designed to address the security concerns of a conventionally weaker state. This strategy, buttressed by the country’s nascent nuclear capability, was aimed at denying India space for exploiting conventional superiority. More recently however, Pakistan’s introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons is the possibility of diluting the limited war under the nuclear umbrella optionin the shape of Proactive Military Operations being contemplated and believed to be partly driving India’s massive conventional military modernization and buildup. According to the ‘offense-defense theory,’ if the ODB tilts in favor of the offense, it would result in the creation of an environment that encourages situations conducive to war and crises in a regional setting such as South Asia.
The second argument assesses the validity of achieving ‘parity’ in the realm of the nuclear age. I argue that quantitative equivalence in nuclear weapons and capabilities is not mandatory for ensuring deterrence, as the mere possession of such weapons should serve to discourage nuclear aggression.
On the other hand, seeking numerical parity has traditionally been a dilemma confronting conventional deterrence. However, even in a nuclearized South Asia, Pakistan’s strategists did not find it feasible or necessary to match bullet for bullet vis-a-vis India (conventional capabilities). The primary reason why Pakistan placed greater reliance on consolidating its nuclear deterrent was an economic one – a smaller, struggling economy providing limited opportunities to enter into defense deals for purchasing conventional weapons. Pakistan’s quest for achieving a nuclear arsenal of a certain size – while maintaining a minimum deterrence posture – is the result of strategic anxieties resulting from conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, and that have multiplied after the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal agreement (by Pakistan’s calculations, the civil nuclear deal has placed India at a greater strategic advantage, giving it access to develop more fissile material for stocks by separating its military facilities).
I believe that the thinking on strategic issues still lags behind the thinking on conventional ones in South Asia, even after acquiring nuclear weapons (this concern was rightly pointed out by Hans Morganthau). Not only Pakistan, India has also overplayed its security obsession vis-a-vis China and further complicated the prospects for arms control by involving China in strategic triangle.
It is pertinent to reiterate that the acquisition of numerical parity is only relevant for a nuclear weapon state that has adopted a doctrine of nuclear war fighting. Given that the only rationally conceivable role for nuclear weapons can and should be in terms of deterrence, the question of achieving nuclear parity is inherently contradictory with the basic philosophy of deterrence. If we assume that ‘parity’ is not at all a prerequisite for nuclear deterrence, we see that states can indulge in massive build-up of strategic forces and triads not merely due to the demands of defense, but equally due to the dynamics of organizational interests, parochial mindset of the decision makers, and/or the measure of resolve to prove deterrent capabilities if a contingency should arise. Thus, in my view, the quantity vs. quality conundrum (i.e. the question of whether to pursue parity) is largely dependent on a country’s emerging and evolving force posture that is an instrument for its doctrinal and policy objectives.